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The relevance of this study of post-Soviet transition lies in the focus on the technically 
theoretical problems that are nevertheless the key to understanding regional devel-
opment processes in the East of the Baltic Sea. The research aims to verify the theory 
of peripheral capitalism as applied to the Baltic States. The first theoretical objective 
is to draw a distinction between the ideas of modernisation and transformation in a 
regional context. The second objective is to adjust the theory of peripheral capitalism 
to smaller states. To study the features of the transformation of economic and political 
systems in the Baltics, this article conducts comparative analysis. Systemic analysis 
and the principles of theoretical and empirical analysis are used as well. Building on 
this work, the study identifies the deficiencies of the theoretical and methodological po-
tential of transition studies. These include claims that the theoretical and methodologi-
cal potential of transition as applied to post-Socialist and post-Soviet Europe has been 
completely fulfilled. Geographical differences between Latin America and the Baltic 
States are so obvious that they eclipse economic similarities between the processes 
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and development models characteristic of the two regions of the world. An analysis of 
current developments in Latin America makes it possible to forecast the economic and, 
to a degree, political consequences of the trends that are just emerging in the Baltics. 
This article seeks to prove the above thesis.
Keywords:  
transit, transformation, modernisation, theory of peripheral Latin American capitalism, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
Introduction.  
Transition theories as applied to the Baltics
Theoretical explanations of transition have been in demand for 30 years. 
Why do the problems of evaluating, systematising, and analysing the evolution 
of national economic models remain the focus of research? Some of the reasons 
are evident. The world economy constantly goes through changes and post-So-
cialist economic practices are becoming ever more diverse. Yet, the main prob-
lem is the quality of development rather than diversity. This statement can 
be scaled up: ‘the fundamental theoretical and methodological concept of the 
‘transitology paradigm’ that treats current po litical transformations as a move-
ment from an authoritarian regime to a consolidated democracy needs serious 
rethinking’ [1, p. 66]. This warning from 2004 has not been heard. The thesis 
about the end of the transition period continues to be discussed. 
It was Francis Fukuyama, who made an enormous contribution to polit-
ical science: although history did not come to an end, he clearly identified 
the turning point. The turn, however, took longer than one might have ex-
pected in the 1990s.
Elections to the European Parliament followed by voting for the EU leader-
ship reanimated, rather than provoked, the old discussion about the efficiency 
of transition in Eastern Europe [2; 3].
The need for analysis is on the surface. The Baltics are the only part of 
the post-Soviet space that has acceded to the EU. Estonia, Latvia, and Lith-
uania are Russia’s neighbours. The performance of the three states was for a 
long time regarded as the touchstone. This gave another reason for growing 
attention from researchers. Socio-economic processes taking place in a neigh-
bouring country are always an important object of studies, particularly, when 
national security is at play.
Other incentives for research in the area have a heavy theoretical compo-
nent. The central question of our article is the relation between the concepts of 
transformation and modernisation [4; 5].
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We believe that any modernisation is a transformation, but not vice versa. 
A transformation may be successful, beneficial to social and economic prog-
ress. In that case, it is modernisation. Yet a different outcome is possible: a 
transformation that leads to the evident or hidden degradation of the economic 
system and a qualitative decrease in social capital. There are such cases in the 
post-Soviet space. The Baltics, however, are not one [6, pp. 7—18].
Firstly, the economic systems of the Baltics did not develop merely under 
the slogan of transformation and modernisation. A fundamental component was 
westernisation. The understanding that westernisation was superficial came as 
a major disappointment. Institutions, which resembled their global and Europe-
an counterparts, functioned differently or not at all. The thesis that there is only 
one way to handle a modern economy was accepted without reservations [7, 
p. 118], leading to equivocal results. Thus, even the experts who have a mostly 
positive view of the Baltic experience are doubtful about the accomplishments 
of Baltic modernisation: ‘It is difficult to give a clear answer to the question 
whether Estonian modernisation was a success’ [8, p. 7]. Although we do not 
support the perception of the Baltic reforms as a success story, we are not ready 
to label them as a failure.
The practices of institution-building in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania after 
1991 were based on the principle that ‘the best way to material affluence and 
prosperity, to standards of living comparable with the French and German av-
erage, is Europeanisation with strategic support from the US’ [9, pp. 19—20]. 
The replicated economic attributes were partly familiar to the architects of the 
reforms from the textbook Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies. On 
the one hand, that seemed absolutely logical: ‘Since the struggle ended in the 
victory of the capitalist system, the key institutions of defeated socialism had 
to be dismantled and reconstructed to the design of the victorious system’ [10]. 
The same happened in Russia and Kazakhstan despite the latter’s remoteness 
from the nominal West.
On the other hand, a mistake was made. The economic institutions of the 
West are ever-transforming and ever-evolving. The ratio between econom-
ic and political priorities constantly changes. In copying the institutions, it 
was important to take into account history and geography. ‘[P]ost-communist 
countries were compelled to adopt 20,000 new laws and regulations — none 
of which were really debated in their parliaments — to meet the requirements 
for accession to the EU’.1 Yet another mistake was to confuse liberalism in 
1 Krastev, I. The metamorphosis of Central Europe. URL:https://www.ips-journal.eu/regions/
europe/article/show/the-metamorphosis-of-central-europe-3219/ (accessed: 15.06.2020).
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politics and ideology and liberalism in economic practice. ‘There is a huge 
difference between a neoliberal policy, particularly an economic policy, and 
truly liberal demands for independent courts, accountability of public officials, 
struggle against corruption and electoral fraud, and the rule of law from top to 
bottom’ [11].
The major problem of the Baltic States was the idealisation of the actual 
positive effects of liberalisation, including economic openness. ‘[T]he impact 
of liberalization on inequality is muted when countries are at higher levels of 
financial development or when no financial crisis ensues after liberalization. 
This lends further support to the view that the benefit-to-cost ratio of liberal-
ization is higher for countries above a certain level of financial development 
and where countries have adequately strengthened financial regulations before 
liberalization’ [12, p. 48]. The thesis once put forward by Milton Friedman has 
been proven by Poland, which was very cautious when opening its markets, 
especially the financial market. Although the openness of the national financial 
system and the virtual elimination of national control over the movement of 
capital ‘confer[] many benefits in theory, in practice liberalization has often led 
to economic volatility and financial crisis’.2
David Woodruff, a professor of political science at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, writes: ‘democracy’s success has been that it aids 
in the design of locally appropriate policies, policies that take for granted 
that dynamiting inherited industries is unlikely to be the best course’ [14]. 
It is difficult, almost impossible to argue with the above statement. It was 
made, however, not in 1991 but several decades later when all political 
and economic decisions had already been taken. Or, to put it differently, 
Woodruff’s words are anything but practical recommendations. The thesis 
of the esteemed expert is lucid: building a democracy takes its toll, par-
ticularly on the quality of governance. What should one do if the toll has 
been taken but thirty years later the quality of democracy continues to raise 
questions? ‘The established and enduring autocratic tendencies in some 
countries do express ... incomplete and, in many areas, unjust and unequal 
transformation into a democracy and a market economy.’3 The above was 
2 Furceri, D., Prakash L. Opening Up to Inequity: After countries remove restrictions 
on capital flows, inequality often gets worse. URL: https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/
IMF022/23064-9781513570532/23064-9781513570532/23064-9781513570532_A014.xm 
l?language=en&redirect=true (accessed: 15.06.2020).
3 Bröning, M. ‘Too German, too Western European’. URL: https://www.ips-journal.eu/inter 
views/article/show/too-german-too-western-european-3595/ (accessed: 14.06.2020).
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written after Estonia had formed a government led by the far-right Con-
servative People’s Party of Estonia and members of the French National 
Front had visited Tallinn. ‘It is therefore clearly possible to have economic 
ar rangements that are fundamentally capitalist and political arrangements 
that are not free’ [15, p. 10].
The interim results are as follows. None of the characteristics of the Baltic 
economic models is unique or entirely new in economic theory. The challenge 
lies in finding an optimal combination of these characteristics, identifying their 
mutual influence, measuring their cumulative effect, and verifying their specific 
properties. ‘There is a serious danger facing a researcher of modern economic 
growth, namely, becoming engrossed in tracking similar changes undergone 
by societies that differ so much in their cultural traditions and trying to build 
a strict development trajectory mandatory for all nations’ [16, p. 23]. That is 
why the tools of theoretical analysis should be constantly improved; traditional 
approaches, developed; and new ones, employed. 
This study aims to examine the development of the Baltic States from the 
perspective of the theory of peripheral market or peripheral capitalism.
The theory of peripheral capitalism:  
key concepts and applicability to the Baltics
All contemporary economic theories apply to a degree to states of different 
size. We are interested, however, in those that are:
1) applicable to small states;
1) comprehensive; their results can be employed interdisciplinary, i.e. they 
take into account the history, geography, and local political processes [17, 
pp. 60—78].
In the 1960—1970s, a new line of research, dependency theory, ger-
minated in international social studies. It has also been called the theory 
of dependent development, dependent capitalism, peripheral development, 
and peripheral capitalism. At first, it sought to explain how economical-
ly disadvantaged periphery, represented by most Asian, African, and Latin 
American states, develops.
Naturally, the dichotomy Western Europe — Eastern Europe was far from 
the focus of  theoretical debates. We believe that the failures of classical mod-
ernisation, which turned into vulgar westernisation in Eastern Europe, necessi-
tate the search for new applicable theoretical models.
Central to numerous dependency theories is the idea that the economy and 
politics of a country are shaped by the development of a dominant economy/
105I. A. Maksimtsev, N. M. Mezhevich, N. P. Sirota
economic bloc. These theories, including the theory of peripheral capitalism, 
hold that the world economy has several hierarchical levels. Grossly gener-
alised, these are the centre, the periphery, and the semi-periphery. This division 
was inspired by the fact that ‘[p]roximity in geographic, cultural, and institu-
tional terms allows special access, special relationships, better information, 
powerful incentives, and other advantages in productivity and productivity 
growth that are difficult to tap from a distance’ [18, p. 245]. This begs the ques-
tions: what distances are meant here and, what is more important, is periphery 
identified in geographic or economic terms?
Cuba, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico are equally the periphery of the 
American world. Geographical distances are of no consequence here. The 
same holds true for Europe. Germany’s neighbour, the Czech Republic is a 
periphery, just as Portugal and Estonia are. The above thesis by Michael Por-
ter, however, does not cater for the post-Socialist transition. If the transition 
is treated as a category of economic and political science, the Czech Repub-
lic and Estonia appear farther that one might expect from the European core. 
This does not cancel dependencies but makes dependencies more diverse 
and more difficult to examine.
With some reservations, modernisation theories maintain that, by copying 
the economic and political institutions of a certain country or region, it is possi-
ble to ensure both a higher economic growth rate and a new quality of econom-
ic and political development. Contrarily, dependency theories emphasise that 
states cannot move from being the centre to becoming the periphery and vice 
versa, just as an Indian cannot change his or her caste. A prominent advocate of 
the theory writes about this approach: ‘The myth of the worldwide expansion 
of capitalism has evaporated as has the myth of development of the periphery 
in the image and likeness of the centres’ [19, p. 21].
The theory of peripheral capitalism was a response not to the liberal eco-
nomic approaches of the 1990s but to the failures of all theories and practices, 
including Keynesian ones. The latter claimed that replicated institutions and 
import substitution are a way to overcoming backwardness. The essence of 
modernisation is the belief that all countries go through the same stages in 
their development. Peripheral states, therefore, are found at the stage where 
developed countries were in the past. Countries that once made an impressive 
leap forward, viz. Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, have been cited as exam-
ples of successful modernisation [20—22]. We nevertheless believe that these 
states are the proverbial exception that proves the rule. From the perspective 
of economic development, their success cannot be viewed as a gradual upward 
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movement. In 1945, none of the three countries existed; in 1975, none regarded 
them as the touchstone, unless authoritarian rule could be considered the de-
sired standard. The case of the Baltics is very different.
Adherents of dependency (peripheral development) theory have consistently 
criticised the concepts of modernisation theory, arguing that lagging countries 
are not early versions of the modern market economies of the centre. These 
experts maintain that the characteristics of the periphery and semi-periphery 
make them a completely different phenomenon. Countries of the (semi-) pe-
riphery have unique features and structural distinctions; their position in the 
global economic system is purely dependent.
The chief advocates of dependency theory, Andre Frank [23, pp. 155—248] 
and Paul Baran [24, pp. 164—170], write that the historical roots of inequal-
ity lie in the relative backwardness of periphery societies, their poor inclu-
sion in the world economy, their informal status of dependent and subordinate 
partners. States that have been classified as the ‘periphery’ lose their ability to 
develop independently; they tread the path of dependence and backwardness. 
Overall, the researchers assume that the centre is interested in keeping the pe-
riphery underdeveloped. Similarly, the ‘semi-periphery’ seeks to press home its 
competitive advantage over the periphery.
This leads to the question as to how the theory of peripheral capitalism 
works in a setting of the second decade of the 21st century. Obviously, it cannot 
be employed in full and in its initial guise. What amendments should be made? 
How do theoretical approaches change when applied to not Uruguay, Ecuador, 
or Columbia but Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania? To answer these questions, we 
put forward fourteen theses.
1. Calibration of the theory is needed because not all peripheral states have 
the formal status of developing countries. Countries of both the periphery and 
the centre are market economies. This means the same capitalism and the same 
laws of the market. Peripheral capitalism does not work according to some 
different laws, as many proponents of the theory of peripheral capitalism be-
lieved. The universally recognised elements of theoretical reflection on the 
market economy should be augmented with a few necessary components. The 
most important of them is the path dependence concept proposed by the Nobel 
Prize winner Douglass North. He defined the term as ‘the consequence of small 
events and chance circumstances can determine solutions that, once they pre-
vail, lead one to a particular path’ [25, p. 92]. A ‘particular path’ is, for instance, 
transit and transportation functions of the economy: the may disappear, yet the 
economic model shaped by them will persist.
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2. It is necessary today to take into account not only the economics of in-
dustrial and agricultural production but also services, including financial and 
educational ones. These services, which create high value-added, testify to the 
superior, non-peripheral status of a country. Naturally, they have nothing to do 
with the classical ‘beach-castle-restaurant’ tourism industry.
3. Quite a long time ago, Theotonio dos Santos advanced the following 
thesis: ‘[t]he relation of interdependence between two or more economies, 
and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when 
some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, 
while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection 
of that expansion’ [26]. Of course, in the 1970s, this approach could not be 
applied to the then divided Europe. 
The situation has changed since then. Today the periphery and semi-periph-
ery have much more opportunities. These opportunities arise when the centre 
is gradually growing and its political and economic power is increasing. This 
applies perfectly to the Baltics. Acceding to the European association of 1993 
and 2003 was an extremely attractive prospect [27]. The aspirations of the Es-
tonians, the Latvians, and the Lithuanians could have been different if they had 
had to deal with the European Union of 2019.
4. Evenly spread economic growth is impossible just as it is impossible 
to attain universal equality among people or states. Dependency theories do 
not deny this fact. Their point is that the approaches that are dominating the 
world economy inevitably contribute to disparities between the centre, the 
semi-periphery, and the periphery. The centre gains a competitive edge by 
setting the rules for the world economy, migration, diffusion of innovation, 
and the price scissors [28]. If the rules are not acceptable for the centre any 
more, it waives them and in doing so exercises its monopoly right. In the 
1970s and 1980s, this was not evident. There was an illusion that, albeit not 
always just, the rules were permanent.
5. Keynesian strategies of import substitution and industrialisation have ex-
perienced a revival [29—31].
Protectionism in international trade, billed as a mechanism to expedite 
structural transformations and keep domestic demand within national borders, 
turned out to be popular with the centre too [32—34].
6. The case of theories in question suggests, that unlike the 1960s and 1970s, 
almost all economic concepts have received an interdisciplinary interpretation 
as well as interdisciplinary critique [35].
7. A major theoretical problem was the distinction between dependency 
theories, stages theories, and the theory of echelons in world capitalism de-
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velopment, for instance, that proposed by Alexander Gerschenkron. His the-
ory holds that the development of countries was pre-programmed long before 
modern market economies had emerged. Echelon theory is of particular in-
terest when applied to Eastern Europe, particularly, the Baltics [36]. It is easy 
to see that the countries that simply did not exist during the rise of capitalism 
could not achieve capitalism independently (as those of the first echelon did). 
Either they attained it under external influence, which initiated self-develop-
ment sources (second echelon), or capitalism was transplanted from outside 
(third echelon) [37]. We believe that the Baltics fall into the second or the 
third category.
8. A serious problem of the approach in question was that most of its authors 
were from Latin America, which they considered the periphery. This perspec-
tive is questioned today and, naturally, it was questioned 45 years ago. If Latin 
America is the periphery, how should one classify Africa and most of Asia? The 
idea of fitting the diversity of national economies into the centre and periphery 
categories is constrictive but difficult to put into practice [38].
9. The Prebish–Singer hypothesis, without which the theory of peripheral 
capitalism does not stand up, has attracted much criticism. It was formulated 
for a perfect market economy and hardly or not at all allowed for political fac-
tors. The classical version of the Prebish–Singer hypothesis holds that coun-
tries that manufacture the end product benefit most, whereas raw material-ex-
porting economies inevitably worsen their situation. The hypothesis drew on 
analysis of prices of agricultural and, partly, industrial goods. Expensive raw 
materials and, with some reservations, fuel were barely taken into account, just 
as services were. There was much debate about verifying the hypothesis and 
turning it into a theory. A comprehensive study by the International Monetary 
Fund (2010) tracked fluctuations of raw materials prices from 1650. The re-
search proved that, in the long term, prices of any type of raw material would 
decrease as compared to prices of industrial goods [39, p. 12].
Our concept maintains that the Prebish–Singer hypothesis is equally appli-
cable to the services sector. In its case, the centre distributes activities that gen-
erate maximum profit. This concerns, foremost, the powerful financial services 
segment. Other types of services, which are less profitable or even loss-making 
by design, emerge and function in the periphery. 
Below we will consider a case that has become a trademark of Estonia 
and Latvia. Over the past 30 years, all attempts of the states and businesses 
to create a national financial system have failed in these countries [40]. Each 
time, everything was very much in line with the laws of the market, admin-
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istrative pressure was kept to a minimum, and, what is even more important, 
the Estonian and Latvian governments had no desire whatsoever to protect 
national banks. Scandinavian banks, reliable agents in the global financial 
system, however, were in no need of either competitors or assistants in Es-
tonia and Latvia. The result was the oligopoly of Nordea, SEB (Skandina-
viska Enskilda Banken), and Swedbank. That situation did not bother the 
Estonian and Latvian authorities in the least. US-initiated investigations of 
several European banks, including Latvia’s ABLV, caused the collapse of the 
very last large bank with state capital. Lithuania’s Ukio Bankas and Latvia’s 
Trasta Komercbank were liquidated. In the context of this article, however, 
something different stands out. Once faced with the pressure coming from 
European regulators and allegations by the US Department of the Treasury, 
Swedish and Danish banks started to shut down their operations in the Bal-
tics. They were accumulating the profits, whereas local financial institutions 
were to deal with the losses.
In 2018-2019, the situation in the banking sector of the Baltics deteriorated. 
The US administration accused local banks and branches of Nordic banks of 
handling money of dubious origin.4 On February 9, 2019, the top management 
of Denmark’s largest commercial bank, Danske Bank, announced that it was 
pulling out of the Baltics. The stock prices of Swedish banks were falling. The 
choice was whether to withdraw and sustain moral losses or to stay and suffer 
material ones.
10. Note that ‘the essence of path dependence theory is that the range of 
choices here and now is strictly determined by a choice made somewhere else 
a long time ago’ [41, p. 36]. For the Baltics, this factor is decisive. Economic 
decisions are pre-patterned by current politics, which, in its turn, draws on his-
torical precedents. Although such a situation is covered by theory, its practical 
applicability depends on the actual scale [42].
11. Within the dependency theory, interactions between formal and infor-
mal economic and political institutions are crucial. Formal institutions can be 
transplanted with varying success to foreign environments, whereas informal 
institutions are endemic as a rule. ‘Underdeveloped formal institutions, com-
bined with strong informal institutions (to a greater degree) and some marginal 
formal norms (to a lesser degree) can produce institutional mutants’.5 That is 
4 Ewing J. Sanctions on Russia and North Korea Put Tiny Latvia in U.S. Cross Hairs. URL: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/business/latvia-money-laundering.html (accessed: 
15.06.2019).
5 Malkina, M. Yu. Path dependence explained from difference perspectives. URL: http://
ecsocman.hse.ru/text/16213320 (accessed 14.05.2019).
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exactly what is happening in the Baltics. Institutional mutants are difficult to 
diagnose since they have all the outer attributes of effective institutions of the 
centre.
12. What other characteristics of a local, or peripheral, market do the Bal-
tics have? Firstly, there is a suite of characteristics typical of smaller states 
in general. Among them are insufficient capital and knowledge [43]. Instead 
of investing in Estonia, Apple opted for Denmark and Ireland. The decision 
was prompted by high power rates and the reluctance of local officials to un-
derstand the needs of the investor, Eesti Ekspress (EE) reports.6 The company 
also abandoned its plan to build a server park in the Estonian town of Paldiski. 
The Estonian media wrote earlier about a billion euro investment.7 Against this 
background, the performance of Estonia’s Nortal, which works in the same 
field as the ‘giant success story’, seems modest: in May 2019, the IT ‘giant’ 
Nortal received 50 million euros in bond proceeds.8
Competencies needed for effective development in the times of the third and 
fourth industrial revolution are key to the social capital of any state [44; 45].
The USSR left behind much of its nuclear power technology and employee 
competencies in Lithuania; automotive industry and railway machinery com-
petencies in Latvia; and precision engineering and shale chemistry, in Estonia. 
All of these competencies have been essentially lost. ‘The situation can be 
easily called depressive. Without strong fundamental science, there is no higher 
education, there are no high value-added businesses, and, finally, there is no 
knowledge-intensive Estonia’.9
13. In theory, peripheral economies will benefit from the centre relocating 
some of its production facilities (usually those manufacturing parts, compo-
nents, and units rather than performing final assembly). In the case of the Eu-
ropean periphery, this process is geographically anchored [46; 47]: Sweden 
is moving production to Estonia; Germany, to Lithuania, etc. Geographical 
proximity makes it possible to benefit from differences in salaries and taxes. 
Thus, intra-European economic relations prove the thesis advanced by the 
6 High power rates and passive officials deprive Estonia of 1 billion euros (in Russ.). URL: 
http://prosvet.ee/ArtNews9.aspx?news_id=12615&news_type (accessed: 15.06.2019).
7 Apple abandons its plan to build server park in Paldiski (in Russ.). URL: https://rus.
err.ee/235438/smi-apple-otkazalsja-ot-planov-stroitelstva-servernogo-parka-v-paldiski (ac-
cessed : 10.06.2019).
8 Head of Nortal: We’re to big for Estonian banks (in Russ.). URL: https://www.dv.ee/intervju 
/2019/06/09/glava-nortal-dlja-bankov-jestonii-my-slishkom-veliki (accessed: 12.07.2019).
9 PhD in gene technology: Politicians have to stand by their words (in Russ.). URL: https://
www.dv.ee/mnenija/2019/05/28/doktor-nauk-politiki-dolzhny-otvechat-za-svoi-slova (ac-
cessed: 15.06.2019).
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then director of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, His-
torical Systems, and Civilizations, Immanuel Wallerstein. He argues that the 
relocation of production facilities, which has been observed from the 1970s, 
to semi-peripheral countries seeks to reduce wages, move utilisation costs 
to the economic periphery, cut raw material renewal costs, and minimise tax 
payments [48, p. 262]. This is the most important proof that the theory of 
peripheral capitalism can be applied to the Baltics.
14. The middle-income trap is a situation observed in not only Chile and 
Brazil [49]. Since the theoretical side of the concept is common knowledge, 
we will focus on only one aspect discussed by both academics and practi-
tioners: is limiting salaries a way out? In the case of the Baltics, where sala-
ries are below the EU average, this is not a real solution.  The reaction of the 
influential Estonian businessperson Raivo Vare is quite typical: ‘…although 
salaries are growing faster than anything else is, and our competitiveness in 
the structure of the economy is declining, this is not enough; psychologically 
we are within the gravitational reach of Nordic affluent societies. Catering to 
this psychology, politicians are doomed to do what they are doing now’.10 In 
other words, the problem of the Baltics is both financial performance and psy-
chological dependence on geographically proximate but economically remote 
models [50; 51].
Conclusion
We believe that any theoretical concept that places regional development 
trends into the global economic context can be valid in the case of one location 
and invalid in the case of another. This approach can yield unexpected results 
and open up a new angle on the analysis of what seems to be traditional objects 
of research.
The Baltics are part of the great European integration project [52—54]. Its 
economic and geographical scale means a complex internal structure, within 
which all countries are equal but some ‘are more equal than others’. From 
the theoretical perspective, this situation is the norm and the objective re-
ality of any large economic or political association that has a centre and a 
periphery. The periphery is ‘dependent, controlling only its own resources at 
10 Poverina, E. Raivo Vare: Hunting foreign workers may have unpredictable consequences 
for the Estonian economy (in Russ.). URL: https://rus.postimees.ee/6732813/rayvo-vare-poss-
ledstviya-ohoty-na-gastarbayterov-dlya-estonskoy-ekonomiki-mogut-byt-nepredskazue-
mymi?utm_campaign=20190719&utm_content=2&utm_medium=email&utm_source=rus.
postimees.ee (accessed: 18.07.2019).
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best, and it is more exposed to fluctuations in long-distance markets’ [55, 
p. 5]. A vivid example is the effect of livestock epidemics in China on pork 
prices in Estonia.11 The periphery, however, can have a high status in its own 
eyes or even in the eyes of its allies and partners, or even deliver impressive 
economic performance. Powerful European convergence mechanisms con-
stantly calibrate and gloss over the whole picture. It seems, nevertheless, that 
the situation in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is perfectly compatible with 
the concepts of the theory of peripheral capitalism. Any local or global crises 
will remove the gloss and, once again, raise the question as to what should be 
done with the conflict- and problem-ridden periphery [56, p. 4]. This ques-
tion will have different answers at different scales.
Effective development of Europe and mutually beneficial cooperation 
with the US, China, and Russia could aid in achieving real cohesion between 
the French-German core and the Eastern (Southern) periphery [57; 58]. In 
that case, the Baltics would be at the centre of an economic cooperation 
space that brings together Europe and very different regions of Asia; this 
could require open recognition of the discussed approach or a silent consen-
sus of the leaders.
This is not a very likely scenario. Thus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
will face gradual simplification of the structures of their economies, par-
ticular, in the sectors receiving support from Brussels. The countries will 
lose competencies in hi- and mid-tech areas, whereas the service sector will 
overdevelop.
Our point is that being a periphery in geographical, economic, and political 
terms is a factor that has a very slow effect on economic development. Without 
a large-scale world crisis, the model that has become traditional for the Baltics 
will not undergo a qualitative change, as Latin American experience suggests. 
The pandemic and economic turbulence urge to reconsider the Baltic economic 
model, its theoretical framework, and practices.
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